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SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH
--0000000--

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
-vs-

Case No. 17038

CARAL LEE OWENS and RUDELL

OWENS,
Defendants/Respondents:
--0000000--

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
--0000000--

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
An information was filed against the defendants alleging a
violation of Section 76-6-404 and Section 76-6-412, of the Utah
Code Annotated, 1953, as amended.

The significant portions of the

information cited the language of Section 76-6-410(b) and read:
"On or about the 18th day of June, 1979, at Utah County,
State of Utah, Caral Lee Owens and Rudell Owens, at the time
and place aforesaid, having custody of any property pursuant
to a rental or lease agreement where it is to be returned in
a specified manner or at a specified time, intentionally
failed to comply with the terms of the agreement concerning
returns so as to render such failure a gross deviation from
the agreement, said property being of value in excess of
$1,000."
Defendants, through counsel, moved the Court to quash the
information on the basis that the statutory language of Section

76-6-410(b) and the charging language of the information were
unconstitutionally vague, denying the defendants due process of
law.
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On April 4, 1980, Judge Allen B. Sorensen found that Section

76-6-410(b) was unconstitutionally vague and, therefore, void and''
granted defendants' motion to quash.
Appellant sought appeal from the ruling of unconstitutionality of Section 76-6-410(b)a
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Pursuant to defendants' motion to quash the information on
the basis that the charging statute, Section 76-6-410(b) was
unconstitutionally vague and thereby denied defendants due process
of law, the information was dismissed by order of the Court.

The

defendants were discharged and the State has sought appeal to the
Supreme Court.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL BY APPELLEE
Dismissing the appeal upon the basis that the appeal is taken
by Utah County Attorney's Office and, as such, is not a proper
party to prosecute and pursue the appeal of criminal cases in the
Supreme Court of the State of Utah.
Upholding the finding of the lower court that Section 76-6410 (b) and the language of such section as implemented through the

information filed in the above matter is unconstitutionally vague.
STATMENT OF FACTS
The appellant's recitation of facts are in conformance with
respondents' understanding and with the statements contained in
respondents' "Statement of the Nature of the Case".

ARGUMENT
POINT I
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THE UTAH COUNTY ATTORNEY LACKS THE AUTHORITY TO PURSUE AND
PROSECUTE THIS APPEAL.
The Utah County Attorney is a constitutional officer and is
empowered to perform such duties as may be proscribed by law.
State vs. Jiminez, Utah, 588 P.2d 707 (1978).
The power and duties of the County Attorney are proscribed by
the Legislature in Section 17-18-1, UCA, which provides in
pertinent parts:
"The County Attorney is a public prosecutor, and must:
(1)
conduct on behalf of the state all prosecutions for public
offenses committed within this county • . . (3) . . . the
county attorney shall appear and prosecute for the state in
the district court of his county in all criminal prosecutions
and may appear in all civil cases in which the state may be
interested and render such assistance as may be required by
the attorney general and all such cases that may be appealed
to the Supreme Court. .
"
The attorney general is a constitutional officer whose duties
are also proscribed by law.

State vs. Jiminez, supra.

Section

67-5-1, UCA, provides in pertinent parts, the role of the attorney
general:
"It is the duty of the attorney general: (1) to attend the
supreme court of this state and all courts of the United
States and prosecute or defend all causes to which the state .
. • is a party. • . (5) to exercise supervisory powers over
the . • • county attorneys of the state in all matters
pertaining to the duties of their office. . . (7) when
required by the public service or directed by the governor to
assist in any
county attorny in the discharge of his
duties. 11
o

•

This appeal is taken by the Utah County Attorney in the name
of the State.

The record does not disclose that the Utah County

Attorney is rendering "such assistance as may be required by the
attorney general in all such cases that may be appealed to the

-3-
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supreme court."
The appeal must be dismissed where the Utah County At-torney
takes an appeal in the name of the State without the indication in
the record that such appeal is pursued by the county attorney.as
to render such assistance as may be required by the attorney
general in a case that is appealed to the supreme court.
State vs. Loddy, (Utah, September 29, 1980) 618 P.2d 60.
POINT II
THE CHARGING SECTION, UCA 76-6-410(b) IS SO VAGUE IN DEFINING
THE PROHIBITIVE ACTS THAT IT DENIES THE DEFENDANTS DUE PROCESS OF

LAW.
The United States Supreme Court has long held that no one

,-

may··

be required at the peril of life, liberty, or property to
specultate as to the meaning of penal statutes; all are entitled
to be informed as to what the State commands or forbids.
Linzetta vs. New Jersey, 306 US 451, 59 S. Ct. 618 (1939);
Giaccio vs. Pennsylvania, 383 US 399, 86 S. Ct. 518.

Thus, a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of~
an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must

.,

necessarily guess as it's meaning and differ as to it's applicatioI

i

violates the first essential madates of the due process clause.
Connally vs. General Construction Company, 269 US 385, 46 S. Ct.
()

126 (1926); United States vs. Cardiff, 344 US 174

1

73

s.

Ct. 180

(1952).
The reason for such requirements of statutory certainty are
obvious and delineated by the Supreme Court in Grayned vs. City o_!
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Rockford, 408 US 104, 92 S. Ct. 2294 (1972):
"Vague laws offend several important values. First, because
we assume that man is free to steer between lawful and
unlawful conduct, we insist that laws give the person .._:it
ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what
is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly. Vague laws
may trap innocent by not providing fair warning. Second, if
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is to be preventetr;"
laws must provide explicit standards for those who apply
them. A vague law impermissably delegates basic policy
matters to policemen, judges and juries for resolution on
an ad hock sub·ective basis with the attended dan ers of
ar itrary and discriminatory application. Third, but
related, where a vague statute abutts upon sensitive areas of
basic first amendment freedoms, it operates to inhibit the
exercise of those freedoms. Uncertain meanings inevitably
lead citizens to steer far wider of the unlawful zone . . .
than if the boundaries of the forbidden areas were clearly
marked. 11
In State vs. Musser, (Utah, 1950) 223 P.2d 193, the Utah
Supreme Court concluded that the statute must give adequate
guidance to those who would be law abidding, to advise defendants
of the nature of the offense with which they are charged, or to
guide courts in trying those who are accused.
In the present statute before the Court, a person is left to
speculate as to the meaning of or what might constitute a gross
deviation from an agreement.

Further, such language as "gross

deviation" irnpermissably delegates basic legislative policy
matters to policemen , judges, and juries for resolution on an ad
hock subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and
discriminatory application.
When a judge or jury is confronted with finding a gross
deviation from a rental agreement, the opportunity to varying,
subjective and unequal application of the law is present.

One

jury may find that a gross deviation may constitute one or two

-5-
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days, while another might extend it over a period of months or
even years before they would constitute any violation in the
rental agreement to be a gross deviation.

Allowing a jury to

define the law by allowing them to determine what gross deviation
means, would allow an unequal, arbitrary and discriminatory enforca
of the statute.

A defendant who appeals to the likings of the

jury would surely be granted further extension on any agreement
before the jury could conclude that there was a gross deviation of
the rental contract; however, a different result could be applied
where the individual is of a minority or of a personality to the
disliking of the jury.
Appellant has cited numerous cases where the Court has ruled
with regard to some aspect of a statute somewhat resembling
Section 76-6-410(b) of the Utah Code Annotated.

In each case

1

State vs. Craney, 381 A.2d 630 (ME 1978), State vs. Murgatory, 349
A.2d 600 (NH 1975), People vs. Lafler, 393 NY.2d 484 (1977), People
vs. Rici, 410 NY.

Supp.2d, 619 (1978), and the Utah Court in State

vs. McElhaney, 579 P.2d 328 (Utah 1978), State vs. Chavez, 605
P.2d 1226 (Utah 1979), the Court has ruled upon some aspect of
the case but has failed to confront the issue of whether the
language of "gross deviation" is unconstitutionally vague.

The

case is a matter of first impression in the State of Utah and has
not been ruled on in other states with the exception of the Court
of Appeals of Oregon in State vs. Bovd, 28 Oregon. App. 725, 560
P.2d 689.
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In State vs. Boyd, the Oregon appelhte Court

~onfronted

the

following language:
"Having custody of a vehicle, boat or aircra[t pursuant to an
agreement with the owner thereof whereby such vehicle, boat
or aircraft is to be returned to the owner at a specified
time, he knowingly retains or withholds possession thereof
without consent of the owner for a so lengthy a period beyond
the specified time as to render such retention and possession
a gross deviation from the agreement."
The Court upheld the constitutionality of the statute in a
five-word ruling: after reciting that the trial court held the
statute unconstitutionally vague, the Court stated:

"We find to

the contrary.''
The Court cited State vs. Samter, 4 Oregon App. 349, 479 P.2d
237 (1971) as supportive precedent.
In State vs. Samter, the Court of Appeals of Oregon did not
confront a statute or language reflecting the statute before the
Court, particularly, "gross deviation."
the Oregon Court failed to

de~l

Defendants contend that

adequately with the issue of

vagueness in it's five-word ruling.
The Utah Court in various cases has found a statute's
language void vagueness.

In State vs. Packard, 122 Utah 369, 250

P.2d 561 (1952), the section under attack was section 49-1-29 to
32, UCA, 1943; the one with which the Court dealt chiefly concerned
section 29 which provided as follows:
"It is the duty of every person before commencing employment
with any person, firm or corporation who the employees are
out on labor strick, called by a national recognized union to
register with the Industrial Commission of Utah."
The defendant contended that the above language was vague and

-7-
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uncertain.
In holding that the statute was unconstitutional and void,
the court held that the statute failed to inform persons of
ordinary intelligence, who would be law abiding, what their
conduct must be to conform to it's requirements and the statute
failed to advise the defendant what constitutes the offense with
which he was charged.

Further, the court held that the statute

was susceptible of different interpretation and application by
those charged with responsibility of implying and enforcing it.
The Packard court cited City of Price vs. Jaynes, 133 Utah
89, 191 Po2d 606 wherein a city ordinance provided that:
"The right. . . to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures shall not be violated."
The Jaynes court held that such language was vague and
uncertain~

In State vs. Musser, 118 Utah 537, 223 P.2d 193, the court
held that the phrase "to commit any act injurious . • • to public
morals" was unconstitutionally vague.
Recently, the Supreme Court dealt with the issue before this
Court in State vs. Bradshaw, (Utah 1975) 541 P.2d 800.

In

Bradshaw, the defendant was found guilty of violating section 768-305, UCA, 1953, which read as follows:
"A person is guilty of a class "B" misdemeanor when he
intentionally interferes with a person recognized to be a law
enforcement offical seeking to effect an arrest or detention
of himself or another regardless of whether there is a legal
basis for the .arrest."
The Court held:

-8r ,
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''':!-'he ~anguage of the particular statute v:e a~e here dealing
with is undoubtedly subject to the constitutional challenge
of vagueness. That part of the statute "'regardless of
whether there is a legal basis for the arrest" may be subject
to various meanings and interpretations. If the intention of
the Legislature was to penalize a law abiding citizen by
incarceration because he did not willing submit to an
unlawful arrest, a statute authorizing the same is in
violation of both Utah and the United States Constitution .
. in that it permits and authorizes an arrest without
probable cause and without lawful basis for the arrest.
Likewise, the word "interfeers" as used in the statute
without further definition or elaboration may mean any
protest or verbal remonstration with an officer as well as
the employment of physical force to avoid an arrest. We are
of the opinion that the language of the statute as above
pointed out fails to inform an ordinary citizen who is
seeking to obey the laws as to the conduct sought to be
proscribed. The statute in the particulars above referred to
is in violation of the constitution of this state and the
United States and, therefore, invalid."
CONCLUSION
The language of the charging statute, particularly "gross
deviation from the agreement" is unconstitutionally vague.

It

fails to give adequate warning to a person of ordinary
intelligence to know what is prohibited so that he or she may act
accordingly.

Secondly, the statutes allows for arbitrary and

discriminatory enforcement by police officers and those in charge
of prosecution of offenses.

Finally, the law impermissably

delegates basic policy matters within the sole discretion of the
Legislature to policemen, judges and juries, for resolution on an
ad hock subjective basis with the attendant dangers of arbitrary
and discriminatory application to define what is a crime or not a
crime.
The County Attorney lacks the constitutional power to
prosecute this appeal.
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DATED this

~/]\th day of December, 1980.

s
Attorne
Rudell O ens
Utah Cou y Legal Def enders
107 East 100 South #29
Provo, Utah 84601
373-5510 x 440

Attorney for Defendant
350 East Center
Provo, Utah 84601

Car al Owens

375-9801

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing
to the Utah County Attorney, 51 South University, Provo, Utah,
84601, postage prepaid this
day of December, 1980.
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